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United States v. Barnette
211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000)
I. Facts
Aquilia Marcivicci Barnette ("Barnette") began dating Robin Williams
("Williams") in 1994. The couple moved in together in March 1995 in
Roanoke, Virginia. In April 1996, Williams broke off the relationship and
Barnette continually attempted to reconcile. On April 30, 1996, Barnette
came to Williams's apartment, smashed the windows of her car, and threw
a fire bomb into the apartment. Williams suffered second and third degree
burns on her hands and arms. Williams then moved in with her mother,
Bertha Williams ("Bertha").'
Barnette traveled to Charlotte, North Carolina, and purchased a semiautomatic shotgun. On June 21, 1996, Barnette took the sawed-off shotgun
and walked to a nearby intersection. He stopped the automobile of Donald
Allen ("Allen"). Barnette ordered Allen out of the car and into a ditch,
where he shot Allen three times in the back. Barnette left Allen's body in
the ditch. Barnette took Allen's wallet and car and drove to the home of
Bertha Williams in Roanoke. Upon arriving, Barnette cut the telephone
wire and fired the shotgun into the door. He then chased Williams across
the street. A neighbor tried to phone the police, but Barnette pointed the
gun at her and she retreated into her home. As Williams ran toward her
mother's house, Barnette shot her twice. She died within arms length of her
mother. He then returned to the stolen car and drove back to North
Carolina. On June 25, 1996, Barnette turned himself in to police in Charlotte, North Carolina. Barnette was charged and convicted in the United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina on eleven
counts stemming from these activities. He was sentenced to death under the
Federal Death Penalty Act.2
1. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 808-09 (4th Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 809-10; see 18 U.S.C. SS 3592-97 (1994). Barnette was charged with and
convicted of the following eleven counts: (1)violating the Violence Against Women Act, 18
U.S.C. S 2261(a)(1), (b); (2) using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1); (3) committing arson during a felony in violation of 18
U.S.C. S 844(h); (4) providing false information during the acquisition of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(a)(6); (5)making a firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. SS 5861(f),
5871; (6) being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 55 922 (g)(1), 924(e);
(7)committing a carjacking that results in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2119(3); (8) using
and carrying a firearm during a carjacking that results in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. S
924(c), (1); (9) transporting a stolen motor vehicle across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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Barnette appealed his death sentence and convictions to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. He alleged that the trial
court made the following errors: (1)excluded a potential juror for cause
because the juror expressed uncertainty as to his feelings on the death
penalty;' (2) allowed the Government to use a peremptory challenge on a
lack juror in violation of Batson v. Kentucky;4 (3)failed to dismiss numerous counts for improper venue;' (4) found that he was qualified as an
"intimate partner" under the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"); 6 (5)
refused to give a deadlock instruction to the jury;7 and (6)refused to allow
a defense expert to testify in surrebuttal about new evidence raised by the
Government's expert witness on rebuttal at sentencing!
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit upheld Barnette's conviction in all respects, but
vacated the death sentence.' The court granted a new sentencing hearing
S2312; (10) violating the Violence Against Women Act in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2261(a)(1),
(b); and (11) using and carrying a firearm during the commission of a violent crime that
results in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. S924(c)(1), i). Barnette, 211 F.3d at 810 n.1.
3. Id. at 811-12.
4. Id.; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that it is unconstitutional to strike a juror based on race).
5. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 813.
6. Id. at 814; see 18 U.S.C. S 2261(a) (2000) (mandating that "aperson who travels
across a state line... with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or
intimate partner, and who... intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes
bodily injury to the person's spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished'); see also 18
U.S.C. S2266(a) (2000) (defining spouse or intimate partner as a "spouse, a former spouse.
..and any person who co-habits or has cohabited with the abused as a spouse; and any other
person similarly situated to a spouse who is protected by the domestic or family violence

laws").

7. Barnette,211 F.3d at 817.
8. Id.at 821.
9. Id.at 826. Because several of Barnette's clim were summarily dismissed by the
court they will not be discussed in detail in this note. First, Barnette contended that the
testimony relying on the Psychopathy Checklist Revised was inadmissible because it was not
evaluated for reliability as required byDaubert .MerrellDowPbamaceutics,Inc.Id. at 815;
see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (requiring trial judge to
ensure that the evidence sought to be admitted is based on scientific knowledge, or is reliable,
and to ensure that the evidence will assist the trier of fact or is relevant). The Government
claimed that Daubertdid not apply to the sentencing phase of the trial because that decision
was based on the Federal Rules of Evidence which do not apply at the sentencing phase.
Barnette, 211 F.3d at 815. Because the court determined that the evidence satis&d the
Dabertstandard for admissibility, it did not reach the question of whether Daubert applies
to the sentencing phase. Id.at 815.
The Federal Death Penalty Act permits the use of victim impact evidence as a nonstatutory aggravating factor. Id.at 817; see 18 U.S.C. S 3593(a)(2) (2000). Barnette claimed
that the Government's use of victim impact evidence as an aggravator in this case was
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unconstitutionally vague and that its presentation violated due process. Barne, 211 F.3d at
817. The court found, after reviewing the record for bias and caprice, that the victim impact
aggravating factor in this case had a common sense meaning because the jury was capable of
understanding solely from the language of the factor that it was to consider the impact of the
deaths on the families. Id. at 818. Thus, the court determined that the factor was not
unconstitutionally vague. Id. Also, because Barnette was allowed to present 23 witnesses in
his own mitigation, the victim impact statements did not amount to a violation of due
process since Barnette had ample opportunity to counter the statements. Id.
Barnette next argued that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the statutory
aggravating factor that he created a grave risk to others during the murder. Id. at 819. He
alleged that this instruction was unconstitutionally vague and the evidence presented did not
support that factor. Id. The court found that the jury instruction was not overly broad and
provided a common sense core of understanding. Id. The court also determined that because
Barnette aimed his shotgun at a neighbor and shot Williams within arms reach of her mother,
he placed both women at a grave risk of death. Id. at 820.
Barnette also claimed that he was denied his statutory and constitutional right to
allocution. Id. The court followed UnitedStates v.Hal/,which held that a defendant does not
have a constitutional right to make an unsworn statement of remorse not subject to crossexamination before a jury. Id.; see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 426 (5th Cir. 1998).
Barnette further contended that the death sentence in his case violated 18 U.S.C. S
3595(c)(2)(A) because it was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or arbitrariness. Barnette,211 F.3d at 820; see 18 U.S.C. S3595(c)(2)(A) (2000) (requirig that, should the
court of appeals find that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, the court shall remand the case for reconsideration
or imposition of a sentence other than death). Barnette pointed out several incidents during
the proceedings to support his claim, such as one witness's testimony that the defendant was
a "cold hearted motherfucker," the Prosecutor calling a defense expert a liar in his dosing,
and the Government's presentation of testimony that Barnette raped and sexually harassed
other women. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 821. The court dismissed this claim with a finding that
a death penalty case "will not be emotionless' and that the jury did not impose the death
penalty under improper influence. Id.
Barnette argued that venue was improper. Id. at 813. He claimed that the Western
District of Virginia was appropriate for resolution of counts one and ten because the crimes
of violence and bodily injury occurred in Roanoke, Virginia. Id. The court dismissed this
claim because 18 U.S.C. S 3237(a) states that "any offense... begun in one district and
completed in another... may be... prosecuted in any district in which such offense was
begun, continued or completed." Id.; see 18 U.S.C. S3237(a) (2000). Thus, venue in the North
Carolina district court was appropriate. Counts two and three-were also appropriately tried
in North Carolina because violations of VAWA may be tried in any of the locations involved
in the interstate travel. Barnette,211 F.3d at 813; see 18 U.S.C. S3237(a) (2000). Count eleven,
the capital charge, was also appropriately tried in North Carolina. Barnette,211 F.3d at 814.
18 U.S.C. 5 3235 requires the Government to try capital offenses in the county where the
defendant committed the offense. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. S 3235 (2000) (providing that "trial of
offenses punishable with death shall be had in the county where the offense was committed,
where that can be done without great inconvenience"). However, the offense in the instant
case is using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence in violation of
18 U.S.C. S924(c)(1). Barnette, 211 F.3d at 814. The court found that proper venue for this
offense is where the underlying crime of violence occurred. Id. Therefore, the court determined that venue was proper in North Carolina because the underlying crime of violence
involved traveling across state lines from Charlotte, North Carolina, to Roanoke, Virginia.
Id.
Finally, Barnette claimed that the district court improperly allowed the Government
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based on the trial court's erroneous exclusion of surrebuttal testimony at
the sentencing hearing.1" The court ruled that because the Government's
witness raised a new issue on rebuttal, the Defense must have an opportunity to surrebut those findings."
III. Analysis/Applicationin Virginia
A. Jury Selection

Barnette argued that the district court should not have excluded a
potential juror for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois" because the juror's
views on the death penalty did not prevent or impair his ability to participate in the sentencing phase." The juror stated that "if given two choices,
I would weigh heavily on not wanting to go the death penalty unless it was
very, very, very, very well warranted.&"1 The juror also indicated that he
would try to follow the law to the best of his ability and would consider the
death penalty."i
The Fourth Circuit deferred to the trial court's determination based on
its decision in United States v. Tipton and found that the juror's views on
capital punishment "would prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as a juror."17 The court's conclusion suggests that the standards
produced under Witherspoon and Wainwrightv. Witi

1

have made it difficult

to prevent the exclusion of a juror for cause who admits an aversion to the
death penalty."9 Here, the excluded juror admitted that despite his views,
to use aperemptory challenge to exclude a black juror in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. Id.
at 812; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that it is unconstitutional to

strike a juror based on race). The court dismissed the claim due to the Government's
production of a patently neutral reason for the strike. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 812.
10. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 826.
11. Id. at 824.
12. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
13. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 811; see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968)
(holding that a death sentence would be invalid if the jury was chosen by excluding for cause
those venire persons who voiced general, conscientious, or religious objections to the death

penalty).

14. Barnette,211 F.3d at 812.
15. Id.
16. 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996).
17. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 811; see United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 880 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding that a reviewing court will defer to the discretion of the trial judge when

jurors' answers in voir dire are ambiguous and arguably contradictory because the inquiry
turns largely on the trial court's assessments of the demeanor and credibility of the juror).

18. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
19. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 812; see Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1985)
(clarifying Witherspoon, noting that the juror did not have to make it unmistakably clear
that [he] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment" to justify
the trial judge excluding him).
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he could still follow the law.2 ° Nevertheless, the court struck the juror for
cause.2 1 This case is illustrative of the importance of rehabilitating jurors.
Had defense counsel effectively clarified the juror's opinion on the death
penalty, and eliminated ambiguity in the record, he might have avoided the
strike for cause.

B. Application of the Violence Against Women Act
Five of Barnette's ciiminal counts, including the capital charge, involved violations of the Violence Against Women Act.' Barnette argued
that VAWA should not apply to him because the evidence was insufficient
to show that he was an "intimate partner" of Williams, as required by the
statute.23 The Act defines "intimate partner" as a person who "has co-habited with the abused as a spouse."24 While Barnette contended that he did not
fit the definition, the trial court left it to the jury to decide after instructing
them on the definition provided by the statute."
The jury heard evidence that Williams began renting the apartment
when she and Barnette moved in together.2 Witness testimony evidenced
that the couple were "happy and in love" and that Barnette often used
Williams's car and took her to work. 27 There was also testimony regarding
fights in which Williams asked Barnette to leave the apartment because he
was too possessive. 28
The Fourth Circuit is the first United States Court of Appeals to
interpret the meaning of "as a spouse" under VAWA. 29 The court determined that the intimate details described an "intimate relationship" which,
although not husband and wife, was similar to a spousal relationship.3" The
court stressed that the definition of intimate partner uses the words "as a
spouse."3 The use of "as" suggests a relationship similar to a spousal partnership. 2 Defense attorneys should note that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of VAWA would permit a person who has co-habitated with another
for as little as one year to be prosecuted as a "spouse" under the Act.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Barnette, 211 F.3d at 812.
Id. at 811-12.
See 18 U.S.C. S 2261 (2000).
Barnette, 211 F.3d at 814.
Id.;
see 18 U.S.C. S 2266 (2000).
Barnette, 211 F.3d at 814.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 815.
Id.
Id.
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C Jury Instruction

The district court instructed the jury that if it could not agree on either
a sentence of death or of life without parole, the court would sentence
Barnette "as provided by law up to life without the possibility of release."33
Barnette requested that the court instruct the jurors that in the event of
deadlock, the court would "sentence the defendant to life without possibility of release."' 4 The refusal of the this deadlock instruction was discussed
by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States."
The Fourth Circuit did not, however, base its decision solely on Jones.
The court pointed out that the district court's instruction was in compliance with sections 3593 and 3594 of Title 18 of the United States Code. 6
The court also noted that Jones, which came down after the district court's
decision, made it clear that no instruction about the court's sentencing
authority in the event of disagreement is required. Further, the court held
that any error the district court might have made was harmless under the
procedural rules and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if considered
under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 8
D. Surrebuttal
Barnette argued that the district court erred at sentencing when it
refused to allow the defense expert, Dr. Cunningham ("Cunningham"), to
testify in surrebuttal after the Government's expert, Dr. Duncan
("Duncan"), testified to his diagnosis of Barnette as a psychopath. 9 During

the sentencing phase, Barnette presented the testimony of three psychiatric
experts as mitigation evidence.'

Cunningham, a psychologist and risk

assessment expert, testified about the risk of Barnette committing further

33. Id.
at 817.
34. id.
35. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999) (determining that the proposed
instruction has no bearing on the jury's role in the sentencing process; rather, it speaks to
what hap pens in the event that the jury isunable to fulfill its role - when deliberations break
down andthe jury is unable to produce a unanimous sentence recommendation).
36. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 817; see 18 U.S.C. SS 3593-3594 (2000).
37. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 817; seeJones, 527 U.S. at 381.
38. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 817.
39. Id. at 821.
40. Id. at 821-22. Dr. Sultan used the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition,
to diagnose Barnette with depression and borderline personality disorder. Id. Dr. Halleck
also provided adetailed diagnosis from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition,
finding that Barnette suffered from substance abuse, depression, bipolar disorder, intermittent
explosive disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Id.
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violent acts in prison.41 He testified that Barnette's risk for future violence
in prison was very low.42
Prior to the Government's rebuttal, Barnette moved to bar Duncan's
potential testimony about the Psychopathy Checklist Revised and to allow
Cunningham to remain in the courtroom during the rebuttal in order to
prepare for surrebuttal. 3 The district court denied both motions." Duncan
then testified that based on the Psychopathy Checklist Revised, Barnette
was a psychopath and posed a future danger in prison." Until the Government called Duncan, there was no diagnosis of Barnette as a psychopath.46
At the close of Duncan's testimony, Barnette moved to recall
Cunningham to testify in surrebuttal to Duncan's psychopath testimony."z
The Defense then proffered the testimony that Cunningham would provide
on surrebuttal." The district court denied the motion and found that
Barnette had cross-examined Duncan on the validity of the Psychopathy
Checklist Revised and that Cunningham had nothing additional to contribute. 9
The Fourth Circuit examined the record and found that Duncan's
rebuttal raised new issues.' Prior to Duncan's testimony, no diagnosis of
Barnette as a psychopath had entered the proceeding."' Further, the court
noted that cross-examination is not as effective as the testimony of an expert
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 822-23.

46.

Id. at 822.

47.
Id.
48. Id. Without this proffer the appellate court could not know what Cunningham's
testimony would have been and therefore could not have determined whether it was error
for the trial court to exclude Cunningham's surrebuttal. Objections must be timely, raised
on direct appeal, rely on all possible grounds, and rely on the same set of facts in order to be
properly preserved for appeal in subsequent state and federal proceedings. See generally
Matthew K. Mahoney, Bridging the ProceduralDefault Chasm, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2000)
(suggesting method by which defense counsel can "make record" and avoid procedural
default).
Cunningham's surrebuttal would have included the following: (1) the invalidity of the
Psychopathy Checklist Revised as applied to African-Americans; (2)the inappropriate nature
of the use of the test on Barnette; (3) Cunningham's own application of the Psychopathy
Checklist Revised to Barnette, including a different score on the test that would not qualify
Barnette as a psychopath; (4) Cunningham's opinion that Barnette was not a psychopath; and
(5) his knowledge of other studies addressing the validity of the Psychopathy Checklist
Revised's application to the black population, other than the one the Defense had already
introduced. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 823-24.
49. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 823.
50. Id. at 824.
51.
Id. at 822.
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witness.5 2 The court also found that Cunningham would have testified that
there was no finding on his part that Barnette was a psychopath. 3
The court then reviewed the error to determine if it was harmless.'
In its review, the court looked to cases addressing the importance of psychological testimony." Ake v. Oklahoma5' noted that having two views on a
mental health issue ensures that the defendant receives a fair adjudication
and that the jury does not erroneously impose a punishment. 7 The court
declared that Barnette was deprived of the evidence of the opposing views
of his own doctors.5 " The court held that the denial of surrebuttal evidence
was not harmless error and required a new sentencing hearing.5 9
E. Conclusion
The court emphasized the importance of psychological evidence in this
case. First, the Defense was allowed to present "anti-future dangerousness"
evidence during mitigation. Next, the Government was allowed to rebut
with future dangerousness evidence. Finally, the Defense was allowed to
surrebut, or counter new future dangerousness evidence based on psychological testimony the Government raised on rebuttal. Defense counsel
should take note of the chronology of the proceeding in this case.
Christina S. Pignatelli

52.
53.

Id. at 824.
Id.

54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
470 U.S. 68 (1985).

57.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985) (holding that because psychiatric
evidence was so important, a defendant has a Constitutional right to a court appointed mental
health expert if his mental state will be a significant factor at trial); see Barnette,211 F.3d at
824.
58.
Barnette, 211 F.3d at 824-25.
59. Id. at 825.
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